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Abstract
The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver
exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender
and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly.
However, the justification of this assumption is questionable. It
is more reasonable to let the receiver recognize the pattern of
the sender. In this paper, we investigate what happens if the as-
sumption is relaxed. A framework of signaling games with pattern
recognition and an example are given.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Spence[1], signaling games have been
deeply investigated by many researchers around the world [2-10].
Generally, there are two players in the model, a Sender (S) and
a Receiver (R). The Sender has a certain type t (an element of a
finite set T ) which represents his private information. The Sender
observes his own type while the Receiver does not know the type
of the Sender. There is a strictly positive probability distribution
p(t) on T : p(t) represents the prior probability that the Sender is
of type t and is the common knowledge.
Based on his knowledge of his own type, the Sender chooses to
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send a message from a set of possible messagesM = {m1, · · · , mJ}.
The Receiver observes the message but not the type of the Sender.
Then the Receiver chooses an action from a set of feasible actions
A = {a1, · · · , aL}. The two players receive payoffs dependent on
the Sender’s type, the message chosen by the Sender and the
action chosen by the Receiver.
Although the aforementioned model has been widely used by the
economic community, people seldom notice clearly that they have
made an assumption in the model, i.e., the Receiver is able to
discriminate each type of the Sender distinctly. Actually, only by
this assumption can the Receiver be able to have a probability
distribution on the type set T . However, the justification of this
assumption is questionable. Because the type space T is the pri-
vate information of the Sender, the Sender has no incentive to
tell his secret to the Receiver. The Receiver cannot take it for
granted that he can discriminate each type of the Sender exactly.
The aim of this paper is to investigate what happens if the afore-
mentioned assumption is canceled. We claim that what the Re-
ceiver can do is to recognize the “pattern” of the Sender (The
phrase “pattern recognition” comes from computer science). A
pattern consists of one type or some types, and one type just be-
longs to a pattern. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 discusses the model of signaling games with pattern
recognition. In Section 3, an example is given in detail.
2 The model
Without loss of generality, consider two players in a signaling
game with pattern recognition, i = 1, 2. Player 1 is the Sender
who has private information (i.e., the type). Player 2 is the Re-
ceiver. Different from classical signaling games (where the Re-
ceiver is assumed to know the type space of the sender and dis-
criminate each type exactly), here we relax this assumption and
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let the Receiver recognize the pattern of the sender (A message
can be sent from several patterns. A pattern can send several mes-
sages). The pattern space and the belief distribution hold by the
Receiver are common knowledge. The dynamic timing sequence
of a signaling game with pattern recognition is as follows:
Step 1: Nature (N) selects the type t of player 1, t ∈ T =
{t1, · · · , tK}, K ≥ 2. Player 1 knows t, but player 2 doesn’t know
it. Furthermore, player 2 cannot discriminate each type in T ex-
actly. The pattern space hold by player 2 is T ′ = {t′1, · · · , t
′
K¯},
1 ≤ K¯ ≤ K. T ′ is a partition of T . The belief distribution hold
by player 2 is defined on the pattern space T ′: p(t′) > 0, t′ ∈ T ′,∑
t′∈T ′ p(t
′) = 1. A pattern t′ consists of some types, and one type
belongs to a pattern.
Step 2: After observing the type t, player 1 selects a message m
from his message space M = {m1, · · · , mJ}.
Step 3: After receiving the message m from player 1, player 2
makes an induction p(t′|m) using Bayesian rules, and selects an
action a from his feasible action space A = {a1, · · · , aL}.
Definition 1: The payoffs of player 1 and player 2 are both
related to the type t of player 1, the message m and the action a
of player 2, i.e., u1(t,m, a) and u2(t,m, a).
Note: 1) The strategy s1 of player 1 is a message profile, which
is related to the type t of player 1 and the pattern space T ′ hold
by player 2, i.e., s1 = (m11, · · · , m1K), where m1k(k, T
′) ∈ M =
{m1, · · · , mJ}, k = 1, · · · , K.
2) The strategy s2 of player 2 is an action profile, which is related
to the message m and the pattern space T ′ hold by player 2,
i.e., s2 = (a21, · · · , a2J), where a2j(m, T
′) ∈ A = {a1, · · · , aL},
j = 1, · · · , J .
As shown in Fig. 1, K = 10, K¯ = 4. t′1 = {t1, t2, t3},t
′
2 =
{t4, t5, t6, t7}, t
′
3 = {t8},t
′
4 = {t9, t10}. To describe the perfect
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Fig. 1. The type space and the pattern space.
Bayesian equilibrium of a signaling game with pattern recogni-
tion, we give five basic requirements as follows:
R1: The receiver has a belief about which patterns can have sent
message m. These beliefs can be described as a probability distri-
bution p(t′|m), the probability that the sender is of pattern t′ if
the sender chooses message m. The sum over all patterns t′ ∈ T ′
of these probabilities has to be 1 conditional on any message m.
R2: The receiver can observe the probability distribution of mes-
sages, p(m|t′), when a pattern t′ is given.
R3: The action that the receiver chooses must maximize the
expected utility of the receiver given his beliefs about which
patterns can have sent message m. This means that the sum∑
t′∈T ′ p(t
′|m)min
t∈t′
u2(t,m, a) is maximized. The action a that max-
imizes this sum is denoted as a∗(m, T ′). For simplicity, we still
use a∗(m) to represent a∗(m, T ′).
R4: For each type t ∈ t′ that the sender may have, the sender
chooses to send the message
m∗(t′) ∈M∗(t′) ≡ {m| max
m∈M,t∈t′
u1(t,m, a
∗(m))}
that maximizes the sender’s utility u1(t,m, a
∗(m)) given the strat-
egy chosen by the receiver a∗(m).
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R5: Let |M∗(t′)| be the cardinality of M∗(t′).
p˜(m|t′) =


1/|M∗(t′)|, m ∈M∗(t′)
0, otherwise
(1)
Let T ′(m) denote the set of patterns that have incentives to send
m, i.e., T ′(m) = {t′ ∈ T ′|m ∈ M∗(t′)}. For each message m that
the sender can send, if there exists a type t ∈ t′ such that m∗(t′)
assigns strictly positive probability to m, the belief p(t′|m) that
the receiver has about the pattern t′ of the sender if he observes
the message m satisfies the Bayesian rule:
p˜(t′|m) =
p(t′)p˜(m|t′)∑
t′∈T ′(m) p(t′)p˜(m|t′)
(2)
Definition 2: A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a signaling game
with pattern recognition is composed ofm∗(t), a∗(m), p(t′|m) and
p(m|t′), which satisfies R1–R5.
3 An example
Consider a car trade game. There are two players in the market,
player 1 is the Seller, player 2 is the Buyer. The type space of
player 1 is T = {t1, t2, t3}, where t1, t2, t3 represent low, medium
and high quality of his car respectively. Player 1 knows his type
but player 2 doesn’t know it. The pattern space hold by player 2 is
T ′ = {t′1, t
′
2}, t
′
1 = {t1, t2}, t
′
2 = {t3}, i.e., in player 2’s mind, there
are two patterns: “Not high” and “High”. The belief distribution
hold by player 2 is p(t′1) = α, p(t
′
2) = 1− α.
The message space of player 1 is M = {m1, m2, m3}, where m1,
m2 and m3 represent three bids of the Seller,m3 > m2 > m1 > 0.
The action space of player 2 is A = {a1, a2}, where a1 stands for
“Not buy”, a2 stands for “Buy”. The Seller announces his bids
to the Buyer, and then the Buyer selects his action.
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To describe the payoff functions of two players, u1(t,m, a) and
u2(t,m, a), we assume that the cost for the Seller of type t1 pre-
tending to be of type t2 is c12. Similarly, we define c13 and c23,
and assume c13 > c12 > 0, c13 > c23 > 0. The value for the
Buyer when he buy a car of type t1, t2, t3 are V1, V2, V3 respec-
tively, V3 > V2 > V1 > 0.
1) When the Buyer selects a1:
u1(tk, mj, a1) = 0, k = 1 ∼ 3, j = 1 ∼ 3, j ≤ k
u1(t1, m2, a1) = −c12, u1(t1, m3, a1) = −c13, u1(t2, m3, a1) = −c23
u2(tk, mj, a1) = 0, k = 1 ∼ 3, j = 1 ∼ 3
2) When the Buyer selects a2:
u1(t1, m1, a2) = m1, u2(t1, m1, a2) = V1 −m1
u1(t1, m2, a2) = m2 − c12, u2(t1, m2, a2) = V1 −m2
u1(t1, m3, a2) = m3 − c13, u2(t1, m3, a2) = V1 −m3
u1(t2, m1, a2) = m1, u2(t2, m1, a2) = V2 −m1
u1(t2, m2, a2) = m2, u2(t2, m2, a2) = V2 −m2
u1(t2, m3, a2) = m3 − c23, u2(t2, m3, a2) = V2 −m3
u1(t3, m1, a2) = m1, u2(t3, m1, a2) = V3 −m1
u1(t3, m2, a2) = m2, u2(t3, m2, a2) = V3 −m2
u1(t3, m3, a2) = m3, u2(t3, m3, a2) = V3 −m3
In order to obtain the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the second-
hand car trade game, we show the requirements R1–R5 in details:
R1: ρ = p(t′1|m1), 1 − ρ = p(t
′
2|m1). σ = p(t
′
1|m2), 1 − σ =
p(t′2|m2). λ = p(t
′
1|m3), 1− λ = p(t
′
2|m3).
R2: Player 2 can observe the probability p(mj|t
′
1) and p(mj|t
′
2),
j = 1 ∼ 3.
R3: In order to computing the best strategy (action) a∗(m) of
player 2 when he receives a message m ∈ M , we need to solve
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the optimization problem:
max
a∈A
∑
t′∈T ′
p(t′|m)min
t∈t′
u2(t,m, a) (3)
For this example, the object function is represented as follows:
p(t′1|m)min
t∈t′
1
u2(t,m, a) + p(t
′
2|m)min
t∈t′
2
u2(t,m, a)
=p(t′1|m)min{u2(t1, m, a), u2(t2, m, a)}+ p(t
′
2|m)u2(t3, m, a)
If the Buyer selects a1, the object function is 0. If the Buyer
selects a2, the object function is:
p(t′1|m)u2(t1, m, a) + p(t
′
2|m)u2(t3, m, a) (4)
1) If player 1 sends a message m1, formula (4) will be:
ρ(V1 −m1) + (1− ρ)(V3 −m1) = (V3 −m1)− ρ(V3 − V1) (5)
Comparing formula (5) with zero, there holds:
a∗(m1) =


a1, ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
a2, 0 ≤ ρ < ρ0
, where ρ0 =
V3 −m1
V3 − V1
.
2) If player 1 sends a message m2, formula (4) will be:
σ(V1 −m2) + (1− σ)(V3 −m2) = (V3 −m2)− σ(V3 − V1) (6)
Comparing formula (6) with zero, there holds:
a∗(m2) =


a1, σ0 ≤ σ ≤ 1
a2, 0 ≤ σ < σ0
, where σ0 =
V3 −m2
V3 − V1
.
3) If player 1 sends a message m3, formula (4) will be:
λ(V1 −m3) + (1− λ)(V3 −m3) = (V3 −m3)− λ(V3 − V1) (7)
Comparing formula (7) with zero, there holds:
a∗(m3) =


a1, λ0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
a2, 0 ≤ λ < λ0
, where λ0 =
V3 −m3
V3 − V1
.
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To sum the aforementioned optimal strategies of the Buyer, there
will be the following eight kinds of outcomes:
1) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D1 = {ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, σ0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, λ0 ≤ λ ≤ 1},
a∗(m) = a1, m ∈M .
2) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D2 = {ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, σ0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ < λ0},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m1, m2
a2, m = m3
.
3) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D3 = {ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ < σ0, λ0 ≤ λ ≤ 1},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m1, m3
a2, m = m2
.
4) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D4 = {ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ < σ0, 0 ≤ λ < λ0},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m1
a2, m = m2, m3
.
5) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D5 = {0 ≤ ρ < ρ0, σ0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, λ0 ≤ λ ≤ 1},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m2, m3
a2, m = m1
.
6) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D6 = {0 ≤ ρ < ρ0, σ0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ < λ0},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m2
a2, m = m1, m3
.
7) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D7 = {0 ≤ ρ < ρ0, 0 ≤ σ < σ0, λ0 ≤ λ ≤ 1},
a∗(m) =


a1, m = m3
a2, m = m1, m2
.
8) For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D8 = {0 ≤ ρ < ρ0, 0 ≤ σ < σ0, 0 ≤ λ < λ0},
a∗(m) = a2, m ∈M .
R4: For each type t (t ∈ t′) that the Seller may have, we com-
pute the optimal message m∗(t′) ∈ M∗(t′) for the Seller in these
eight zones D1, · · · , D8, i.e., we need to solve the maximization
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problem:
max
m∈M,t∈t′
u1(t,m, a
∗(m)) (8)
1) Consider the zone D1. There exists a
∗(m) = a1, m ∈M .
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a1) = −c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a1) = −c13
m∗(t1) = m1. (9)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a1) = −c23
m∗(t2) = m1 or m
∗(t2) = m2. (10)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a1) = 0
m∗(t3) = m1 or m
∗(t3) = m2 or m
∗(t3) = m3. (11)
Comparing formula (9), (10) and (11), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D1,m
∗(t) = m1, t ∈ T ; orm
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1, t2
m2, t = t3
;
or m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1, t3
m2, t = t2
; or m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2, t3
; or
m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2
m3, t = t3
.
Therefore, for (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D1, M
∗(t′) = {m1}, t
′ ∈ T ′; or M∗(t′) =
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

{m1}, t
′ = t′1
{m2}, t
′ = t′2
;
orM∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m1}, t
′ = t′2
; orM∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m2}, t
′ = t′2
;
or M∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
2) Consider the zoneD2. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m1, m2
a2, m = m3
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a1) = −c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a2) = m3 − c13
m∗(t1) =


m1, c13 ≥ m3
m3, 0 < c13 < m3
. (12)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a2) = m3 − c23
m∗(t2) =


m1, c23 ≥ m3
m3, 0 < c23 < m3
, or m∗(t2) =


m2, c23 ≥ m3
m3, 0 < c23 < m3
.
(13)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a2) = m3
m∗(t3) = m3. (14)
Comparing formula (12), (13) and (14), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D2,
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• If 0 < c13 < m3 and 0 < c23 < m3, then m
∗(t) = m3, t ∈ T .
• If 0 < c13 < m3 and c23 ≥ m3, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t2
m3, t = t1, t3
,
or m∗(t) =


m2, t = t2
m3, t = t1, t3
.
• If c13 ≥ m3 and 0 < c23 < m3, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
.
• If c13 ≥ m3 and c23 ≥ m3, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1, t2
m3, t = t3
,
or m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2
m3, t = t3
.
Therefore, for (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D2,
• If 0 < c13 < m3, then M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If c13 ≥ m3 and 0 < c23 < m3, then M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If c13 ≥ m3 and c23 ≥ m3, then M
∗(t′) =


{m1}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
, or
M∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
3) Consider the zoneD3. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m1, m3
a2, m = m2
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a2) = m2 − c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a1) = −c13
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m∗(t1) =


m1, c12 ≥ m2
m2, 0 < c12 < m2
. (15)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a1) = −c23
m∗(t2) = m2. (16)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a1) = 0
m∗(t3) = m2. (17)
Comparing formula (15), (16) and (17), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D3,
• If 0 < c12 < m2, then m
∗(t) = m2, t ∈ T .
• If c12 ≥ m2, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2, t3
.
Therefore, for (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D3, M
∗(t′) = {m2}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
4) Consider the zoneD4. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m1
a2, m = m2, m3
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a2) = m2 − c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a2) = m3 − c13
12
m∗(t1) =


m1, c12 ≥ m2, c13 ≥ m3
m2, 0 < c12 < m2, c13 − c12 ≥ m3 −m2
m3, 0 < c13 < m3, c13 − c12 < m3 −m2
. (18)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a2) = m3 − c23
m∗(t2) =


m2, c23 ≥ m3 −m2
m3, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2
. (19)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a2) = m3
m∗(t3) = m3. (20)
Comparing formula (18), (19) and (20), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D4,
• If c12 ≥ m2, c13 ≥ m3, c23 ≥ m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2
m3, t = t3
. M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If c12 ≥ m2, c13 ≥ m3, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
. M∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If 0 < c12 < m2, c13 − c12 ≥ m3 −m2, c23 ≥ m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m2, t = t1, t2
m3, t = t3
. M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If 0 < c12 < m2, c13 − c12 ≥ m3 −m2, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2, then
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m∗(t) =


m2, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
. M∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If 0 < c13 < m3, c13 − c12 < m3 −m2, c23 ≥ m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m2, t = t2
m3, t = t1, t3
.
If m3 − m2 ≥ c13, then M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′; else M∗(t′) =

{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If 0 < c13 < m3, c13 − c12 < m3 −m2, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) = m3, t ∈ T . M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
5) Consider the zoneD5. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m2, m3
a2, m = m1
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a1) = −c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a1) = −c13
m∗(t1) = m1. (21)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a1) = −c23
m∗(t2) = m1. (22)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a1) = 0
m∗(t3) = m1. (23)
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Comparing formula (21), (22) and (23), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller: For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D5, m
∗(t) = m1, t ∈ T .
M∗(t′) = {m1}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
6) Consider the zoneD6. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m2
a2, m = m1, m3
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a1) = −c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a2) = m3 − c13
m∗(t1) =


m1, c13 ≥ m3 −m1
m3, 0 < c13 < m3 −m1
. (24)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a2) = m3 − c23
m∗(t2) =


m1, c23 ≥ m3 −m1
m3, 0 < c23 < m3 −m1
. (25)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a1) = 0
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a2) = m3
m∗(t3) = m3. (26)
Comparing formula (24), (25) and (26), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D6,
• If c23 ≥ m3 −m1, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1, t2
m3, t = t3
.
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• If 0 < c23 < m3 −m1 ≤ c13, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
.
• If 0 < c13 < m3 −m1, then m
∗(t) = m3, t ∈ T .
Therefore, for (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D6,
• If c23 ≥ m3 −m1, then M
∗(t′) =


{m1}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If 0 < c23 < m3 −m1, then M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
7) Consider the zoneD7. There exists a
∗(m) =


a1, m = m3
a2, m = m1, m2
.
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a2) = m2 − c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a1) = −c13
m∗(t1) =


m1, c12 ≥ m2 −m1
m2, 0 < c12 < m2 −m1
. (27)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a1) = −c23
m∗(t2) = m2. (28)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a1) = 0
m∗(t3) = m2. (29)
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Comparing formula (27), (28) and (29), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D7,
• If c12 ≥ m2 −m1, then m
∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2, t3
.
• If 0 < c12 < m2 −m1, then m
∗(t) = m2, t ∈ T .
Therefore, for (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D7, M
∗(t′) = {m2}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
8) Consider the zone D8. There exists a
∗(m) = a2, m ∈M .
For t = t1,
u1(t1, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t1, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t1, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t1, m2, a2) = m2 − c12
u1(t1, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t1, m3, a2) = m3 − c13
m∗(t1) =


m1, c12 ≥ m2 −m1, c13 ≥ m3 −m1
m2, 0 < c12 < m2 −m1, c13 − c12 ≥ m3 −m2
m3, 0 < c13 < m3 −m1, c13 − c12 < m3 −m2
. (30)
For t = t2,
u1(t2, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t2, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t2, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t2, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t2, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t2, m3, a2) = m3 − c23
m∗(t2) =


m2, c23 ≥ m3 −m2
m3, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2
. (31)
For t = t3,
u1(t3, m1, a
∗(m1)) = u1(t3, m1, a2) = m1
u1(t3, m2, a
∗(m2)) = u1(t3, m2, a2) = m2
u1(t3, m3, a
∗(m3)) = u1(t3, m3, a2) = m3
m∗(t3) = m3. (32)
Comparing formula (30), (31) and (32), we obtain the optimal
message for the Seller:
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For (ρ, σ, λ) ∈ D8,
• If c12 ≥ m2 −m1, c13 ≥ m3 −m1, c23 ≥ m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m2, t = t2
m3, t = t3
. M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If c12 ≥ m2 −m1, c13 ≥ m3 −m1, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2, then
m∗(t) =


m1, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
. M∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If 0 < c12 < m2−m1, c13− c12 ≥ m3−m2, c23 ≥ m3−m2, then
m∗(t) =


m2, t = t1, t2
m3, t = t3
. M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If 0 < c12 < m2−m1, c13− c12 ≥ m3−m2, 0 < c23 < m3−m2,
then
m∗(t) =


m2, t = t1
m3, t = t2, t3
. M∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
• If 0 < c13 < m3−m1, c13− c12 < m3−m2, c23 ≥ m3−m2, then
m∗(t) =


m2, t = t2
m3, t = t1, t3
. M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
.
• If 0 < c13 < m3−m1, c13− c12 < m3 −m2, 0 < c23 < m3 −m2,
then
m∗(t) = m3, t ∈ T . M
∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′.
R5:
For M∗(t′) = {m1}, t
′ ∈ T ′:
T ′(m1) = {t
′
1, t
′
2}, T
′(m2) = T
′(m3) = φ
p˜(m1|t
′) = 1, p˜(m2|t
′) = p˜(m3|t
′) = 0, t′ ∈ T ′
p˜(t′1|m1) =
p(t′1)p˜(m1|t
′
1)
p(t′1)p˜(m1|t
′
1) + p(t
′
2)p˜(m1|t
′
2)
= α
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For M∗(t′) = {m2}, t
′ ∈ T ′:
T ′(m1) = T
′(m3) = φ, T
′(m2) = {t
′
1, t
′
2}
p˜(m1|t
′) = p˜(m3|t
′) = 0, p˜(m2|t
′) = 1, t′ ∈ T ′
p˜(t′1|m2) =
p(t′1)p˜(m2|t
′
1)
p(t′1)p˜(m2|t
′
1) + p(t
′
2)p˜(m2|t
′
2)
= α
For M∗(t′) = {m3}, t
′ ∈ T ′:
T ′(m1) = T
′(m2) = φ, T
′(m3) = {t
′
1, t
′
2}
p˜(m1|t
′) = p˜(m2|t
′) = 0, p˜(m3|t
′) = 1, t′ ∈ T ′
p˜(t′1|m3) =
p(t′1)p˜(m3|t
′
1)
p(t′1)p˜(m3|t
′
1) + p(t
′
2)p˜(m3|t
′
2)
= α
For M∗(t′) =


{m1}, t
′ = t′1
{m2}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m2) = {t
′
2}, T
′(m3) = φ
p˜(m1|t
′
1) = p˜(m2|t
′
2) = 1, p˜(t
′
1|m1) = p˜(t
′
2|m2) = 1.
For M∗(t′) =


{m1}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m2) = φ, T
′(m3) = {t
′
2}
p˜(m1|t
′
1) = p˜(m3|t
′
2) = 1, p˜(t
′
1|m1) = p˜(t
′
2|m3) = 1.
For M∗(t′) =


{m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = φ, T
′(m2) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m3) = {t
′
2}
p˜(m2|t
′
1) = p˜(m3|t
′
2) = 1, p˜(t
′
1|m2) = p˜(t
′
2|m3) = 1.
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For M∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m1}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = {t
′
1, t
′
2}, T
′(m2) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m3) = φ
p˜(m1|t
′
1) = p˜(m2|t
′
1) = 0.5, p˜(m1|t
′
2) = 1,
p˜(t′1|m1) =
p(t′1)p˜(m1|t
′
1)
p(t′1)p˜(m1|t
′
1) + p(t
′
2)p˜(m1|t
′
2)
=
α
2− α
p˜(t′2|m1) =
2− 2α
2− α
, p˜(t′1|m2) = 1.
For M∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m2}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m2) = {t
′
1, t
′
2}, T
′(m3) = φ
p˜(m1|t
′
1) = p˜(m2|t
′
1) = 0.5, p˜(m2|t
′
2) = 1,
p˜(t′1|m2) =
p(t′1)p˜(m2|t
′
1)
p(t′1)p˜(m2|t
′
1) + p(t
′
2)p˜(m2|t
′
2)
=
α
2− α
.
p˜(t′2|m2) =
2− 2α
2− α
, p˜(t′1|m1) = 1.
For M∗(t′) =


{m1, m2}, t
′ = t′1
{m3}, t
′ = t′2
:
T ′(m1) = T
′(m2) = {t
′
1}, T
′(m3) = {t
′
2}
p˜(m1|t
′
1) = p˜(m2|t
′
1) = 0.5, p˜(m3|t
′
2) = 1,
p˜(t′1|m1) = p˜(t
′
1|m2) = p˜(t
′
2|m3) = 1.
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